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Abstract
Security is a growing concern in the hardware design world. At all stages of the
Integrated Circuit (IC) lifecycle there are attacks which threaten to compromise the
integrity of the design through piracy, reverse engineering, hardware Trojan insertion,
physical attacks, and other side channel attacks — among other threats. Some of the
most notable challenges in this field deal specifically with Intellectual Property (IP)
theft and reverse engineering attacks. The IP being attacked can be ICs themselves,
circuit designs making up those larger ICs, or configuration information for the devices
like Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Custom or proprietary cryptographic
components may require specific protections, as successfully attacking those could
compromise the security of other aspects of the system. One method by which these
concerns can be addressed is by introducing hardware obfuscation to the design in
various forms. These methods of obfuscation must be evaluated for effectiveness and
continually improved upon in order to match the growing concerns in this area.
Several different forms of netlist-level hardware obfuscation were analyzed, on standard
benchmarking circuits as well as on two substitution boxes from block ciphers. These
obfuscation methods were attacked using a satisfiability (SAT) attack, which is able
to iteratively rule out classes of keys at once and has been shown to be very effective
against many forms of hardware obfuscation. It was ultimately shown that substitution
boxes were naturally harder to break than the standard benchmarks using this attack,
but some obfuscation methods still have substantially more security than others. The
method which increased the difficulty of the attack the most was one which introduced
a modified SIMON block cipher as a One-way Random Function (ORF) to be used for
key generation. For a substitution box obfuscated in this way, the attack was found
to be completely unsuccessful within a five-day window with a severely round-reduced
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Hardware security is the concept of protecting circuit information against many
possible types of attacks, such as reverse engineering, inserting malicious hardware
Trojans, or creating counterfeit devices based on the original.
These attacks can differ at the various stages of the Integrated Circuit (IC) lifecycle,
and each entity involved has its own assets to protect, as well as its own possible



























Figure 1.1: IC Lifecycle Concerns. The middle column shows the stage in the cycle, the
left column represents the assets each stage wants to protect, and the right column shows
the types of attack each stage can perform.
The Intellectual Property (IP) vendor is concerned with protecting the IP itself. One
method of protecting their Hardware Description Language (HDL) IP is to encrypt
the HDL itself before sending it to future stages. This encryption is done in such a
way that tools are able to decrypt the design and modify it, but the actual circuit
data is never exposed [1]. As an attacker, the vendor/designer could insert a backdoor
or hardware Trojan to compromise the security of further stages in the process.
The System on Chip (SoC) design house can be vulnerable to maliciously modified
Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools that could insert hardware Trojans or
gather data on their implementation of the design, as well as the malicious behaviors
from the IP providers, since complex IC designs can be comprised of multiple instances
of IPs. These attacks cannot be easily prevented, but can be detected through trust
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verification methods [2]. Once detected, the toolchain can be modified to remove
the malicious tools. The SoC designers would also be able to attack the end user by
inserting their own Trojans or attack the vendor by counterfeiting the design.
Currently, foundries are not particularly susceptible to attacks by other entities in the
IP lifecycle. However, once a design is ready to be manufactured, the foundry has the
ability to exploit it in many ways, as it is inherently given access to low level chip
representation information in order to fabricate it, often in the form of GDSII files.
They are then able to insert their own hardware Trojans or overproduce a chip with
the intention of selling the extras.
Finally, the end users are concerned with protecting their own personal data. They
are vulnerable to a number of malicious behaviors from other stages, like Trojans
and backdoors inserted into the design. End users are able to attack a design by
reverse engineering the IP to counterfeit the device or performing side-channel attacks
to acquire secret information stored in the IP. These attacks primarily affect the IP
vendor/designer [2, 3]. Each of these possible attacks has its own protections, several
of which will be explored further in this document.
When manufacturing new circuits, a significant concern is that most designers creating
these systems do not have direct access to a fabrication method. As a result, most
chip fabrication is done through external services that cannot necessarily be trusted.
These outside manufacturers could be performing many of the hardware attacks noted
earlier by reverse engineering the design. Even without reverse engineering, untrusted
manufacturers could still overproduce a device and sell the extra for their own profit,
either to end users or to the initial designer’s competitors [4].
A major-area of concern with IP piracy is that the configuration information, the
bitstream in the case of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), could be reverse
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engineered. While the issue of manufacturing piracy mostly concerns the design of
Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) or other custom designs, FPGA
programming is widespread and accessible, so the effect of these attacks could have a
substantial reach. Protections against these attacks must be evaluated for effectiveness,
and more advanced countermeasures must be found to guard against increasingly
complex attacks.
One common technique used to protect hardware designs is to obfuscate the design
itself, such that reverse engineering becomes too expensive, in either time or resources,
for an adversary to realistically accomplish. This obfuscation can be done at different
stages of the lifecycle, ranging from the HDL being modified to make it more difficult
to understand, to the netlist, which is used to either generate a bitstream — in the
case of FPGAs — or generate the hardware design for manufacture — in the case of
ASICs, being manipulated. Other methods of protection rely on encrypting certain
aspects of the design, or even the design description itself, such that only trusted users
with the correct key can utilize the sensitive information [1].
1.2 Thesis Objective
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate some of the currently proposed hardware
obfuscation techniques, both on existing benchmark circuits as well as on specific non-
linear cryptographic components. The cryptographic components analyzed include
substitution boxes, namely the 8-bit S-box from Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
and a larger 16-bit S-box from MK-3 [5,6]. Further, it will explore satisfiability (SAT)
attacks as a method of defeating hardware obfuscation, and the effects which different




The novel contributions of this work primarily focus on implementing different methods
of obfuscation on the S-box component of the configurable block cipher MK-3. The
effectiveness of these obfuscation methods on this component were evaluated with the
SAT attack. Finally, the use of the lightweight block cipher SIMON was tested for




2.1 Hardware Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering is a necessary precursor to most attacks on hardware IP designs;
the ultimate goal of this approach is usually to determine most or all of the underlying
functionality of the targeted design. This can be accomplished through a number of
methods, including inferring the function of the system and extracting the circuit
implementation details [7]. Reverse engineering also differs based on the type of system
being targeted; determining the functionality of a system on a FPGA can be very
different from reverse engineering an ASIC.
2.1.1 FPGA Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering a FPGA relies on the adversary being able to extract and decipher
the bitstream used to program the device [8]. It is the job of the FPGA vendors to
make this as difficult as possible, through offering measures like bitstream encryption
as well as by ensuring that their bitstream specifications are not publicly available.
There have been several projects that have attempted to thwart these measures,
though, and some have been able to at least partially reverse engineer a bitstream
back into a usable netlist.
6
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
In [9] the use of a tool called “debit” is discussed as a means of reverse engineering
the bitstream format for several of Xilinx’s older FPGA devices — namely the Virtex
4 and Virtex 5, among a few others. This work was partially successful, as some of
the configuration information for the netlist could be recovered. Over 90% of the
bitstream in these cases was made up of switching box logic — specifically Program
Interconnect Point (PIP) data — and the tool was only able to recover some of that
data.
Another tool was later called Bitstream Interpretation Library (BIL) [10]. This tool
expanded upon the previous work and created a database that contains many of the
component definitions and mappings from Xilinx’s older bitstreams. This method uses
files which can be obtained through the Xilinx toolchain for Xilinx ISE, called the
XDL and XDLRC files. These are netlist files that describe the design and structure of
the device being used. Unlike the work done using the “debit” tool, this work was able
to completely decipher a large segment of the PIP information using the information
from the XDLRC file. It was not, however, able to reverse the PIP commands for
primitive site and several other types of tiles [8].
Finally, an effort was put forth by Mathias Lasser to reverse engineer both Lattice’s
iCE40 bitstream and Xilinx’s 7-series FPGA bitstream, which is for their most recent
family of devices [11]. Lasser was able to completely reverse engineer Lattice’s iCE40
FPGA bitstream, which is a very small device compared to Xilinx’s FPGAs. This
was accomplished by debugging and slightly modifying the vendor-supplied bitstream
generation tool. This is the best-case scenario for FPGA reverse engineering, but it is
very unlikely to work on most applications where the bitstream mapping information is
more carefully hidden. Reversing the Xilinx 7-series bitstream was a more substantial
challenge, as this bitstream was notably more complex and included features like
error correction that made the bitstreams difficult to analyze. It was ultimately done
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through careful analysis of the bitstream by converting the data to a bitmap image
and identifying patterns. The full mappings have not been released; however, it can
be assumed that an adversary — given enough time and resources — could manage
to reverse engineer a bitstream for an FPGA using a combination of these methods.
2.1.2 ASIC Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering of ASICs is more focused on analyzing the physical chip after
production. This can be done at a number of different levels depending on the
adversary and their capabilities [7].
At the IC level, an attacker has several options available to reverse engineer a fabricated
device, both nondestructive and destructive. For a nondestructive attack, the adversary
can use X-ray tomography and ptychography to analyze the internal structure of a
chip layer-by-layer without having to alter the device itself [2, 12]. If the adversary is
willing to alter or destroy the IC in the process of reverse engineering it, the attack
could entail delayering the chip and using microscopy (optical, Scanning Electron
Microscope (SEM), Transmission Electron Microscope (TEM), or any combination
thereof) to analyze each layer individually [7].
Once the chip has been fabricated and mounted on a Printed Circuit Board (PCB),
the reverse engineering can extend to that PCB itself. This would allow an attacker to
gain a greater understanding of the chip’s outward interactions. The attacks against
PCBs are largely the same as those against ICs, in both the nondestructive and
destructive attack approaches [13].
A full system would consist of a number of ICs, PCBs, and other configuration
information to allow the device to work as intended. This is what most end-users
would receive. This configuration information is often stored in some form of non-
volatile memory. A reverse engineering attack on a completed system would likely
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include attacks on the individual components, as mentioned above, as well as reverse
engineering the configuration data, which can contain information about the system’s
final operation and timing.
An understanding of the functionality of the IP gained through reverse engineering
can lead to a number of attacks, such as counterfeiting and Trojan insertion, that go
beyond the initial issues of stealing the design or other trade secrets [2].
2.2 Intellectual Property Attacks
2.2.1 Hardware Trojans
Hardware Trojans are additional components added to a design that act in a malicious
way. They are intended to be difficult to detect and can cause problems with the
affected circuit ranging from minor malfunctions to early system death to leaking
critical information. Trojans are characterized by three main features: malicious
intent, difficulty to detect, and rare activation [14].
A Trojan must have malicious intent to be considered a Trojan. It must be inserted
by an adversary with the intention of compromising the design in some way, otherwise
it cannot be considered a Trojan.
A Trojan must also be placed in such a way that it is difficult to detect. It would not
benefit an attacker if a Trojan could be easily identified and removed, so the intention
is that they be well disguised from normal testing and analysis of the modified device.
This relates to the third characteristic: by crafting a Trojan so that it only triggers
on rare occurrences, the likelihood of it being detected in normal testing is greatly
reduced. In theory, these triggering conditions could be entirely skipped in ordinary
fault testing, but are likely to arise under extended operation in the field [15].
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There are several kinds of Trojans that could be inserted into a design with different
intended outcomes. One form is a basic device that would, when triggered, cause a
malfunction at the output. An example of this from [15] is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Combinational Trojan Example [15]
This Trojan would be inserted into the path of signal S and change the output to be
S*. When the trigger condition (a=0, b=1, c=1) is met, S* becomes the inversion of S
and likely introduces a malfunction in the design. If this Trojan is placed strategically,
this error could propagate through much of the circuit and leave the output completely
unusable.
Another form of Trojan is one that leaks critical information from the design when
triggered. A Trojan of this kind is proposed in “MOLES: Malicious Off-Chip Leakage
Enabled by Side-Channels” [16], which can leak critical information through side chan-
nels. The given example depicts a MOLES-based Trojan inserted into a cryptographic
processor to leak the key information, shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: MOLES Example Trojan [16]
2.2.2 Counterfeiting
Counterfeiting a design is the process of creating illegal copies of IP. The issue of
counterfeiting has become greater with the increased use of offshore foundries and
the lack of effective avoidance mechanisms [17]. Often, this approach requires reverse
engineering of the design, however it links closely to the problem of overproduction —
which does not necessarily require full reverse engineering to create counterfeits of a
design.
2.2.3 Overproduction
Overproduction is mainly a concern with ASIC production at untrusted foundries. It
is possible that a bad actor at a foundry/fab could produce more of a design than
necessary and sell the extra for profit. This sale could be to new end users or to the
initial designer’s competitors, who could then reverse engineer the design to uncover
secrets [2].
The counter to this attack is called metering, and it refers to carefully controlling the
number of devices that are produced, for whom they are made, and their properties.
11
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Obfuscation can be enacted to help prevent this attack by ensuring that a produced
device is unusable without some final configurations that would be done by a trusted
actor or the design house itself [4, 18].
2.3 Hardware Model Encryption
One approach to protecting hardware designs is to encrypt the HDL using cryptographic
methods. This prevents the end users of these models from accessing the plaintext
of the design and being able to maliciously influence it. The main method for this
HDL encryption is defined in IEEE Standard P1735 [1]. This document provides
standards of practice for encrypting the IP using both symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography, as well as recommendations for how to manage licensing and distribution
of the encrypted IP.
These standards allow vendors to send encrypted versions of their designs to customers
who have properly purchased them, and for those customers to have their EDA tools
decrypt the IP internally. This ensures that the end user never has access to the
plaintext, but is still able to use the secured component [19].
By encrypting the design, vendors are preventing some of the more basic attacks from
end users — namely counterfeiting the design or stealing secrets from within it. This
encryption is useful to that extent, but it does very little to protect against reverse
engineering or any attacks at the manufacturing stage, should the IP be intended for
use in an ASIC.
However, vulnerabilities were discovered in IEEE standard P1735 roughly two years
after it was adopted. It was prone to several attacks that could, in the worst cases,




Though it doesn’t necessarily directly protect the IP, hardware authentication is often
considered one of the main methods of stopping IP piracy. Authentication involves
techniques like digital watermarking, which can prove who created the initial design
by embedding digital signatures in the design that should only be known to the IP
vendor [21]. This, however, is only useful in litigation should the design be stolen.
2.5 Hardware Obfuscation
Hardware obfuscation consists of a series of methods by which the function of a design
is modified to make it infeasible to understand or use without the proper information,
such as a key. These are intended to protect the IP at almost all stages of the hardware
development process. Obfuscation of this kind is able to offer protections against
reverse engineering of the hardware itself by either the manufacturer or end user,
insertion of hardware Trojans by the manufacturer, and overproduction of the device.
Since functionality is affected, without the secret necessary for proper operation the
device will not behave normally and most attacks are, ideally, prevented.
These techniques can vary significantly in their implementation, from introducing
extra elements into the design, to swapping signal paths based on differences from
chip-to-chip.
2.6 Hardware Obfuscation Methods
There are a number of different methods of obfuscating the function of a design. Some
rely on inserting additional combinational logic along paths in the design to act as




2.6.1 Netlist Logic Locking
The following methods obfuscate hardware designs by adding combinational logic into
the original design to create false outputs if not configured properly. This configuration
usually comes in the form of key inputs to the circuit — additional inputs that function
as a secret key, similar to a cryptographic function.
2.6.1.1 Random Locking
The first method of netlist level logic locking, proposed in “EPIC: Ending Piracy of
Integrated Circuits,” relies on randomly placing XOR and XNOR gates throughout
a circuit to act as the obfuscation [22]. Each locking gate would be connected to an





Figure 2.3: XOR Lock Gate
These locking gates would be picked based on the key bit input — XOR for ‘0’, XNOR
for ‘1’ — and would then be placed randomly throughout the circuit. The key bit/gate
combinations are determined by the logical characteristics of the gates: when one
input of an XOR is a ‘0’ it acts as a buffer for the other input, and the opposite is
true for XNOR.
It is unlikely that a circuit obfuscated in this way would be unlocked by multiple
keys, though is technically possible in certain situations. In [22] this is said to be
possible in a circuit consisting entirely of XOR and XNOR gates, as an XOR tree
can be unlocked by 50% of all key combinations. However, it is possible in a circuit
consisting of any number of XOR and XNOR gates; should two locking gates be made
the inputs of another XOR or XNOR gate those key bits could be invalidated in
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certain combinations. Another instance where multiple keys could unlock the circuit
comes when employing any form of stacking locking gates or surrounding an inverter,





Figure 2.4: Lock Gates Surrounding an Inverter
With the configuration in Figure 2.4, if both lock gates are given the wrong input the
inversions will cancel out and the proper value will be passed. This has the capability
to invalidate some key bits in certain combinations and allow for multiple functional
keys. The likelihood of this occurring should be low, especially in a large enough
circuit, and the risk of this becoming a significant problem is mitigated by having
a suitably large key. Flaws like this can also be avoided entirely by modifying the
placement algorithm to account for similar configurations of gates; in this case, the
gates would no longer be placed truly randomly, but by removing the possibility of
this occurring the locking would on average be stronger with fewer invalidated key
bits.
It was determined in [22] that a “suitably large key” is larger than 64 bits, as that
can withstand a brute force attack with today’s technology. That does not, however,
guarantee that the circuit is secure, as there are several other attacks currently
developed, and possible new attacks, that can break this encryption much more
quickly than a brute force attack would be able to on average.
2.6.1.2 Fault Analysis-Based Logic Locking
A logic locking technique is created in [23] in which the location of XOR/XNOR
locking gates are determined by using similar methods to those used in fault-analysis
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of completed circuits. As such, incorrect inputs to locking gates can be pictured as
stuck-at-0 (s-a-0) or stuck-at-1 (s-a-1) faults depending on the input pattern of the
initially locked circuit.
The metrics that take advantage of this definition were designed to combat possible
inadequacies with the random locking scheme from [22] — specifically those dealing
with fault propagation and fault masking problems, as shown by the previously
discussed lock gate interactions with other XOR and XNOR gates.
Fault propagation in this context is the idea that not all incorrect keys will propagate
their “error” through the circuit. Given circuit input patterns, some key gates might










Figure 2.5: Fault Propagation Example
In the circuit in Figure 2.5, for any set of inputs to the circuit with both C and D as
1, the output of G3 will output a 1 and the effect of the locking gate L1 will not be
propagated to the output.
Fault masking refers to a property which states that when exciting multiple stuck-at
faults some of the faults’ effects could be covered up by other faults later in the circuit.
The same thing can happen with key gates in a locked netlist.
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Using fault analysis tools, the ideal locations for locking gates can be determined such
that the hamming distance between the correct and incorrect outputs is 50%, meaning
that for an incorrect key half of the output bits will be incorrect. This is achieved by
looping through the netlist and determining the fault impact of each gate and then
locking the gate with the highest fault impact until the correct number of key bits
have been achieved. The fault impact is determined using Equation 2.1.
Fault impact = (No. of Test Patternss−a−0 ×No. of Outputss−a−0)
+ (No. of Test Patternss−a−1 ×No. of Outputss−a−1)
(2.1)
2.6.1.3 Strong Logic Locking
In [24] a logic locking technique, referred to as Strong Logic Locking (SLL), was
proposed that utilizes key gates in a way similar to [22], but that offers other heuristics
for where those gates should be placed to be as effective as possible. These methods
of gate placement are determined by a gate’s “mutability,” or the ability to determine
its key bit by “muting” another locking gate in the circuit — similar to fault masking
from [23]. There are several definitions for each locking gate based on its placement
within the circuit: isolated, dominating, concurrently mutable, sequentially mutable,
and non-mutable. Each of these gate definitions has an associated attack that could
allow the attacker to determine its key bit.
Isolated Key Gates An isolated key gate is one that does not have a path to all
other key gates. For example, if two key gates input directly into the final gates for
two separate outputs. These gates cannot have any effect on each other or any other
key gates, so they are both isolated.
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Dominating Key Gates A dominating key gate is one that is on every path
between another key gate and an output. This key gate’s output would “dominate”
the output of the earlier gate.
Concurrently Mutable Convergent Gates Mutable convergent gates are gates
that converge at another gate whose outputs can be “muted” by placing a certain bit
on an input to another gate such that the effect of the lock cannot be seen. For two
gates to be concurrently mutable, one gate’s bit must be able to be determined by















Figure 2.6: Concurrent Key Gate Muting
The effect of K1 can be muted by setting E=0, and the effect of K2 can be muted by
setting F=1. Once a gate is muted, the key value of the other can be sensitized.
Sequentially Mutable Convergent Gates Sequentially mutable gates are muta-
ble gates which only go in one direction. If the key bit for K2 can be found by muting
K1, but not the other way around, the gates are sequentially mutable.
Non-Mutable Convergent Gates Non-mutable convergent gates are key gates
that converge to another gate, but no key gate values can be found by muting another
key gate’s effect.
The method for inserting key gates for increased circuit protection is then to add gates
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such that the number of non-mutable gates is maximized. This is done by representing
the key gates of a circuit in a graph, referred to as an “interference graph,” in which
each locking gate is a node, dashed edges connect mutable gates, and solid edges
connect non-mutable gates. Sequentially mutable gates are connected by both a solid
and a dashed edge, to show that only one of the gates can be muted to find the value
of the other.






















Figure 2.7: Circuit with Locking Gates for Demonstrating SLL Graph




Figure 2.8: SLL Interference Graph
Gates L1 and L2 are connected to each other with non-mutable edges, as they are
non-mutable convergent gates. Both gates can be muted by setting E=0 for L1 and
F=1 for L2; however, neither can be used to determine the value of the other.
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The other gate connections are sequentially mutable, with the exceptions of L2
connecting to L3 and L3 connecting to L4. As an example: if E=0 then the effect
of key bit L1 can be muted, which can be used to help determine the values of L3
and L4. This cannot be done in the opposite direction, which makes that connection
sequentially mutable. Similarly, L2 being muted cannot be used to determine L3, and
L3 cannot be used to find L4, so in the interference graph they are disconnected.
By using this method of representing the key gates in a circuit, stronger logical
obfuscation is achieved by maximizing the number of non-mutable edges in the circuit.
This is done by initially inserting a certain percent of the key gates randomly —
Rajendran et. al. used 10% — and then constructing the interference graph of the key
gates. Each further gate was then introduced iteratively, such that for every gate in
the netlist the type of edges connecting to the previous gates were determined. The
type of edge was then assigned a weight, with non-mutable edges being given the
higher weight, and the sum of the weights was calculated. The gate which maximized
this sum was selected for obfuscation and a key gate was inserted at its output.
2.6.1.4 SARLock
SARLock [25], or SAT Attack Resistant Logic Locking, is another extension of the
locking method proposed in EPIC that specifically focuses on increasing resistance to
the SAT attack introduced in [26]. The SAT attack, which is described in detail in
Section 2.7.1, relies on finding Distinguishing Input Patterns (DIPs) that can rule out
incorrect key values, ideally multiple at a time. The worst-case scenario for the SAT
attack then, is that each DIP is only able to rule out a single incorrect key. This is
the goal of SARLock.
This type of obfuscation is done by introducing a comparator into the design, which
compares the key to the circuit input. For certain combinations of the key and input,
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the comparator produces a flip signal, which is XORed with a primary output, thus
inverting it. This is shown in Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9: SARLock Circuit [25]
The intended effect of this is to ensure that for each input pattern only a single key
will produce an incorrect value. While only the correct key will produce the correct
output for all inputs, other keys will produce an incorrect value for one input pattern.
This effect is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Example Truth Table for a SARLock Circuit
Output for Each Key Value
a b c Y k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=7
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
The truth table defines the behavior of a circuit: Y = (ab) + (bc) + (ac), with key gates
inserted. Only a single output bit will change for each possible key value, ensuring
that each DIP can only rule out a single incorrect key. This is done by creating a
function, flip = F (in, k), where in is the primary input to the circuit and k is the
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key. This flip bit is passed into an XOR gate on the output of the circuit, as shown in
Figure 2.9.
SARLock on its own is not enough to provide protection to a circuit, as it only serves to
increase protection against SAT attacks. As the additional components for SARLock
are isolated from the main circuit, there are several attacks that could remove that
functionality if no additional protections were added. Yasin et. al. recommend a
two-layer locking approach, in which SARLock is combined with SLL from [24]. This
method splits the key into two separate parts, one for locking the logic cone using
SLL, called K1, and one for interacting with the SARLock block, called K2. K2 is
scrambled with K1 for two reasons. First, it ensures that the flips do not all occur on
pre-determined combinations of input and key values. Second, it creates a dependency
between the two keys, which ensures that a simple removal attack cannot reduce the
number of the key bits. In order to extract K2 from the scrambler function, the value
of K1 must be known; however, in order to determine the value of K1 an attack —
possibly a SAT attack — must be performed on the locked logic cone, which the
SARLock block should prevent. This combined functionality is shown in Figure 2.10.




Anti-SAT is another netlist locking method of hardware obfuscation designed to
attempt to thwart the SAT attack [27]. The aim of Anti-SAT is to include a small
additional circuit that greatly increases the number of iterations the SAT attack will
take to break the function. The method of obfuscation has two configurations, known
as type-0 and type-1. Both are made of two additional functional blocks, g and g,
which share the primary inputs but have differing keys. In type-0 Anti-SAT the output
of these blocks is then tied to an AND gate, while in type-1 they are tied to an OR
gate, as shown in Figure 2.11.
(a) type-0 Anti-SAT Block (b) type-1 Anti-SAT Block
Figure 2.11: Anti-SAT Configurations [27]
By feeding the output of the g and g blocks into an AND or an OR gate, this circuit
now produces a single bit output, defined by the following functions:
Y = g( ~X ⊕ ~K1) ∧ g( ~X ⊕ ~K2) (2.2)
Y = g( ~X ⊕ ~K1) ∨ g( ~X ⊕ ~K2) (2.3)
Equation 2.2 gives the equation for the output of a type-0 Anti-SAT block, and
Equation 2.3 gives the equation for a type-1 block. The inputs and keys in this
case were only XORed for simplicity, but in a realistic implementation it would be
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a combination of XORs and XNORs in accordance with the key bits, similar to the
implementation in EPIC [22].
These equations, if the correct key is given, should then always output either a 0 in
the case of the type-0 block, or a 1 in the case of a type-1 block. These blocks are
then integrated into a circuit as shown in Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12: Anti-SAT Type-0 Integrated into a Locked Circuit [27]
Based on whether a type-0 or type-1 block is used, the “New Gate” highlighted in the
figure could either be an XOR or an XNOR to guarantee that the output is correct
with the correct key.
How these Anti-SAT blocks connect to the locked circuit is important for increasing
the level of complexity of the SAT attack. It is recommended that the inputs to the
block are connected to primary inputs from the original circuit, and the output is
connected to a randomly selected internal wire within the top 30% observability.
In [27], it is recommended that the Anti-SAT blocks also be combined with another
obfuscation method to provide resilience against other types of attacks. SLL is





In [28], a method of netlist-level logic locking is proposed which uses Look-Up Tables
(LUTs) to obfuscate the netlist rather than simpler gates, as were used in other
methods [22–25,27]. This proposed method also includes specific heuristics for which
gates should be obfuscated by these LUTs so that the design is secure against SAT
attacks.
The research in [28] points to a number of different ways to utilize LUTs for stronger
logical obfuscation, some of which differ between FPGAs and ASICs. In FPGAs the
hardware itself is fixed, but can be reconfigured. This gives the designer an abundance
of LUTs and other hardware resources that can be used for obfuscation. When routing
for a FPGA bitstream, individually defined gates are mapped to LUTs of various sizes.
This can be leveraged to insert obfuscation logic into the design. Gates can be placed
in larger-than-necessary LUTs, with the additional inputs being fed by Non-Linear
Feedback Shift Registers (NLFSRs) or Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). These
can act as internal keys, so that the bitstream will function properly only on a specific
device that is configured to produce that particular output. This method of utilizing
LUTs in FPGAs is shown in Figure 2.13.
(a) Unmodified Circuit (b) Obfuscated Circuit with LUTs
Figure 2.13: FPGA Obfuscation LUT Example [28]
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The red, purple, and yellow groups of gates all became larger-than-necessary LUTs
with PUFs leading to some inputs. These are the obfuscated gates in the design.
The use of LUTs for obfuscation in ASICs differs substantially from their use in
FPGAs, as they are not readily available resources for a fully custom design. LUTs
can lead to substantial area and delay overheads with modern technology, so they
need to be used more sparingly and should be placed more specifically so as not to
interfere with timing or power specifications. Their use is rather simple, though: the
gates selected for obfuscation are removed and replaced with equivalent LUTs. The
functionality of these LUTs can be hidden from the fab, and are then programmed at
a trusted facility later.
The heuristics for where to best place these LUTs are what provide more substantial
protection against SAT attacks. There are five algorithms established in [28] on which
LUT-Lock is based, each used to remove weaker gates for obfuscation from a list of
possible candidates. These algorithms are:
1. FIC: Fan-In Cone of minimum number of primary outputs
2. HSC: Focusing on Higher Skew gates in FIC
3. MFO-HSC: Focusing on gates with Minimum Fan-Out
4. MO-HSC: Focusing on gates with least impact on primary outputs
5. NB2-MO-HSC: Avoiding back-to-back insertion of LUTs
FIC The first algorithm is focused on reducing the output corruption of the locking
gates, which increases the difficulty of the SAT attack. This is done by selecting
only fan-in cones that affect the fewest number of primary outputs of the circuit.
Due to intersections in these fan-in-cones, it is rare that only only a single output
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will be affected; however, it should be minimized as much as possible. This can be
accomplished by doing a Breadth First Search (BFS) to find the closest cells to the
selected output for obfuscation. After all gates in the selected fan-in cone are replaced,
a new output is selected and the process is repeated. The selected output must have
a large fan-in cone so as to offer more candidate gates for obfuscation.
HSC This algorithm relies on creating a candidate gate list based on the Signal
Probability Skew (SPS) of all gates in the selected output’s fan-in cone. Through the
original researchers’ testing, it was found that gates with higher SPS are better for
obfuscation. SPS is defined as | Pr(0)−Pr(1) |, where Pr(0) is the probability that the
gate will produce a 0 and Pr(1) is the probability that the gate will produce a 1 based
on possible inputs. This is a measurement of how controllable a gate is by the primary
inputs of the circuit. By selecting gates with a high skew, it raises the chances that a
SAT attack will select inputs that will test the output of that particular gate.
MFO-HSC This is another step that focuses on lowering the output corruption
of the locked gates. It finds the gate to obfuscate by determining the gates with
minimum fan-out. If multiple gates have the same fan-out, the gate with the higher
SPS is selected. This is done to attempt to reduce the corruption to only gates within
the initial fan-in cone, with the intention of reducing the corruption at intersections.
When a gate is selected for obfuscation, the gates in its fan-in cone are added to the
list of candidate gates for the next iteration of the method.
MO-HSC This is an incremental improvement over MFO-HSC, in which the number
of affected primary outputs is accounted for. Some gates can have larger fan-out but
only affect a single primary output. MO-HSC, instead of finding the fan-out cone of a
gate, calculates how many outputs are affected by this gate. This approach requires
additional processing to find each candidate gate, but should further reduce the output
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corruption. Similarly to MFO-HSC, once a gate is selected to be obfuscated its fan-in
cone is added to the list of candidate gates for the next iteration.
NB2-MO-HSC This final algorithm utilizes MO-HSC, but additionally accounts
for the back-to-back insertion of LUTs. When multiple LUTs are placed sequentially
multiple keys could be able to unlock those obfuscated gates, due to De Morgan’s
Laws. Each additional locked gate in a fan-in cone increases the number of possible
keys for unlocking, which leads to an exponential increase in the number of successful
keys. This is avoided by ensuring that no new obfuscated gate feeds into a previously
added one.
The NB2-MO-HSC algorithm is the most complete algorithm for finding the gates
to be obfuscated, so this is ultimately the algorithm which was used in the final
LUT-Lock design.
2.6.2 ORF Insetion
To provide additional obstruction between the primary inputs of a circuit and a locked
netlist, Yasin et. al. proposed inserting an ORF between the key inputs of the circuit
and the key inputs of the logic locked device [29]. This is shown in Figure 2.14.
Figure 2.14: ORF Insertion [29]
An ORF is a random function whose inverse is infeasible to compute, meaning its
input pattern cannot reasonably be determined by its output pattern. These functions
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prevent attackers from determining the key inputs to the function from its outputs by
disassociating them.
The researchers discuss using a modified AES block cipher with a hard-coded key
as the ORF for these locking schemes, as they are reliable one-way functions [29].
The hard-coded key value is implemented to prevent possible removal attacks. Since
the structure of AES is well known, it is possible that an attacker could identify and
remove it; however, by including the key in the design itself, once it is synthesized it
would become much harder to identify and remove.
2.6.3 Binary Decision Diagram Logic Locking
Xu et. al. proposed a method of logic locking that does not function on the base netlist
like those previously discussed, but instead relies on representing the circuit using a
Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) and inserting obfuscation in that before synthesizing
into a netlist [30]. A BDD is a method of representing logic, often used in verification
and synthesis, that shows the logic as a tree of decisions. Figure 2.15 represents the
BDD for an XOR gate.
Figure 2.15: BDD Representation of Y = A⊕B [30]
In the diagram, dashed edges represent the variable being input as a 0, and solid
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edges represent a 1. The final boxes show the output of the function when that node
has been reached. These diagrams can easily be expanded to represent more complex
logical functions.
Using these BDDs, the authors of [30] use Figure 2.16 to describe the obfuscation
method.
Figure 2.16: Obfuscated BDD [30]
K1 and K2 are new variables added to the function which act as key bits. The use of
the proper key, (0,0), leads to f , the original function being obfuscated. Any other key
combination leads to a modified version of the circuit f ′, f ′′, or f ′′′. These modified
circuits provide incorrect functionality, and allow the design to be obfuscated.
This obfuscation method was designed as a countermeasure to the bypass attack that
was introduced in the same paper.
In order to provide resistance from the SAT attack, each incorrect function must
have a Hamming Distance from the original function of 1. This creates only a single
incorrect bit on the output when the wrong key is used, which increases the difficulty
of SAT attacks finding a DIP.
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2.6.4 Finite State Machine Insertion
Another prevalent method of hardware obfuscation is the act of inserting additional
control FSMs, which can work with a key to obscure the functionality of the design.
2.6.4.1 Adding an Isolation State Space
In [15], a method of obfuscation was proposed that uses a separate and isolated
“obfuscated state space” that locks the proper functionality of the design behind a key
sequence. This was designed specifically to protect against hardware Trojan insertion,
as a Trojan inserted into the incorrect state space would be rendered benign. This
concept is shown in Figure 2.17.
Figure 2.17: Obfuscated State Space [15]
A notable benefit of this method of obfuscation is that it offers both obfuscation and
authentication, depending on how the designer chooses to set up the state spaces.
These state spaces come from the following modifications of the State Transition
Graph (STG):
1. The size of the reachable state space is increased with additional state elements.
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2. Certain states which were initially unreachable are used in the isolated state
space.
When the device is booted up, it starts in the “initialization state space,” and a key
must be entered before moving on to the proper circuit functionality. If the entered
key is correct, the device transitions to the “original state space” and is able to function
as intended; however, if it is incorrect the functionality is moved to an “isolation state
space” that offers no way to return to the original state space without rebooting the
device and attempting another key.
The initialization sequence can be made very short, and as such can also be hidden
from the end-user as part of the normal “power-on” latency. This could be particularly
helpful if the key was derived from a PUF so that the design could only work for a
single device, and the user would not need to influence the key.
To greatly increase the size of the obfuscated state space, the authors recommend
inserting a Parallel State Machine (PSM) that defines transitions between the extra
states. This can be folded into the normal functionality so it cannot be extracted and
removed easily. These states that exist in the obfuscated functionality are also what
allow for authentication with this design. If a specific “incorrect” key is given in the
initialization sequence, it can transition to a specific series of states that function as a
digital watermark.
These additional state spaces should make hardware Trojan insertion incredibly
difficult, as effective Trojans must be inserted at locations which will only be reached
on rare events, so the proper functionality must be understood and accessible. If the
attacker is unable to access the normal state space then they cannot insert an effective
Trojan. A randomly placed Trojan is very unlikely to be located at a rare state in the
normal functionality — it is more likely that it would be placed at a common state
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and be found or placed in the isolated state space and would be rendered useless.
2.6.4.2 Utilizing the CDFG
In [31], a similar obfuscation method was suggested; however, it was accomplished by
converting the Register Transfer Logic (RTL) into a Control and Data Flow Graph
(CDFG) to determine where to add the obfuscation state space and mode-control
state machine. First, the RTL is converted to the CDFG and the graph is flattened.
This means that smaller blocks are merged where possible, creating larger CDFGs.
These larger graphs are useful for integrating the mode control logic with the already
existing state control logic. By integrating them, the mode change logic becomes more
difficult to remove.
Once the CDFGs have been created and flattened, branches with large fan-out are
selected for modification to allow for the obfuscated mode of functionality.
The CDFGs are then converted back into RTL with the additional obfuscation added,
which can then be implemented for a device.
2.6.5 Signal Path Obfuscation
A further form of defense through obfuscation relies on modifying the signal paths
between components, as discussed by Wendt et. al. [32]. Figure 2.18 shows a method
for obfuscating the signal paths between components such that they cannot be easily
followed without knowing the Challenge/Response Pairs (CRPs) of a specific PUF.
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Figure 2.18: Obfuscated Signal Path [32]
This method ensures that it cannot easily be determined how different components
connect without knowledge of the set of CRPs for the PUF being used as the select
for the multiplexers. On its own, this method would likely not be enough to protect a
design, though in conjunction with other methods it could help fully protect a design.
2.6.6 ASIC Cell Camouflaging
Another method of obfuscation, specific to the manufacture process for ASICs uses
modified layout-level standard cells for design [33,34]. This approach does not obfuscate
the function, per se, but instead obfuscates the physical appearance of the material
being manufactured. This was done using a camouflaged standard cell library with
modifications to only the dopant layer, keeping all other layers identical. Camouflaging
in this way protects mostly against attacks at a foundry while laying out the design,
but is also a key defense against attacks where the device is being reverse engineered
through use of an X-ray or Scanning Electron Microscope to see the silicon layout of
the design. Another obfuscation technique used with this design is to populate the
empty space on the chip with arbitrary materials laid out in such a way that makes
viewing the design difficult, but does not affect functionality.
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2.6.7 Reconfigurable Logic Barriers
Similar to obfuscation, reconfigurable logic barriers can be utilized to protect the
design from adversaries [4]. This method is done by sectioning off part of the design to
be left reconfigurable after manufacturing. The separation is done in such a way that
each device requires a unique design placed in the reconfigurable area to restore proper
functionality. The main purpose of this approach is to protect against overproduction
at the manufacturing stage, since producing more boards offers the adversary no
benefit without the correct reconfigurable designs.
2.7 Attacks on Hardware Obfuscation
2.7.1 Satisfiability Attacks
One of the main attacks on hardware obfuscation is the SAT attack, which uses the
Boolean satisfiability problem to attempt to determine the key of an obfuscated circuit.
Originally proposed in [26], this attack rules out equivalence classes of keys that do
not lead to the correct output. To accomplish this attack, the adversary must have
access to both the locked netlist and a functional unlocked IC.
Keys are separated into equivalence classes, which are sets of keys where for each key
in the set, the inputs and outputs are equivalent, as denoted in Equation 2.4.
~K1 ≡ ~K2 ⇐⇒ ∀ ~Xi : C( ~Xi, ~K1, ~Yi) ∧ C( ~Xi, ~K2, ~Yi) (2.4)
In the equation, ~K1 and ~K2 refer to the two keys in the equivalence class, and
C( ~Xi, ~K, ~Yi) is the function of the circuit with inputs ~Xi and outputs ~Yi.
By considering these equivalence classes, the SAT attack is able to rule out sets of
keys rather than individual keys, thus increasing the efficiency of the search. Once
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equivalence classes are defined, the attack iteratively rules out incorrect keys through
the use of Distinguishing Input Patterns (DIPs). A DIP is defined as an input vector
where, for two different keys ~K1 and ~K2 the output is different. This output can then
be compared to the output of the unlocked circuit for that input vector and one or
both equivalence classes can be ruled out. This allows the attack to rapidly reduce
the size of the key space in order to narrow in on the correct key.
A miter-like circuit is created to find the DIPs, which creates two copies of the circuit
with the same primary inputs and two different keys [35]. The outputs of these circuits
are XORed to determine if they are the same, and then ORed into a single diff signal.
If any output between the circuits differs, the diff signal is asserted high, as shown
in Figure 2.19.
Figure 2.19: DIP Miter Circuit [35]
To use this to find the DIPs, the full miter circuit is converted to its Conjunctive
Normal Form (CNF) and a SAT solver is run on the description of the circuit. A DIP
has been found once a satisfiable assignment has been found.
Once a DIP has been found, the output of the activated IC can be examined to rule
out either or both of the keys used — and by extension, those keys’ equivalence classes.
This process is repeated either until no further DIPs can be found, indicating that the
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equivalence class of the key can no longer be narrowed down and the correct key has
been found.
Algorithm 1 describes the full process of the attack.
Algorithm 1 SAT Attack [26]
Inputs: C and eval
Output: ~KC
1: function decrypt
2: i := 1
3: F1 = C( ~X, ~K1, ~Y1) ∧ C( ~X, ~K2, ~Y2)
4: while sat[Fi ∧ ( ~Y1 6= ~Y2)] do
5: ~Xdi := sat_assignment ~X [Fi ∧ ( ~Y1 6= ~Y2)]
6: ~Y di := eval(
~Xdi )
7: Fi+1 = Fi ∧ C( ~Xdi , ~K1, ~Y di ) ∧ C( ~Xdi , ~K2, ~Y di )
8: i := i+ 1
9: end while
10: ~KC := sat_assignment ~K1(Fi)
Once the while condition (line 3 ) is no longer true, meaning the miter circuit is
unsatisfiable, the correct key value ~KC is output.
2.7.1.1 Tseitin Transformation
The general conversion of a Boolean formula into CNF is an NP-hard problem and can
result in an exponential explosion of clauses depending on the circuit being transformed.
To resolve this, the tool uses a Tseitin, alternatively known as Tseytin, transformation,
which is a method of easily converting gates into proper CNF by including the output
of the gate as a variable [36]. This transformation also reduces the complexity of the
satisfiability problem by providing only clauses with a maximum of three variables.




An AND gate can be defined by:
(C → (A ∧B)) ∧ (C → (A ∨B)) (2.5)
Implications are replaced with equivalent logic using only AND, OR, and NOT:
(C ∨ (A ∧B)) ∧ (C ∨ (A ∨B)) (2.6)
The equation is then be put in CNF by using distribution on the leftmost clause:
(C ∨ A) ∧ (C ∨B) ∧ (C ∨ A ∨B) (2.7)
Table 2.2 shows the applicable Tseitin transformations for all two-input gates and an
inverter.
Table 2.2: Tseitin Transformations [37]
Type Operation CNF Expression
AND C = A ·B (C ∨ A) ∧ (C ∨B) ∧ (C ∨ A ∨B)
NAND C = A ·B (C ∨ A) ∧ (C ∨B) ∧ (C ∨ A ∨B)
OR C = A+B (C ∨ A) ∧ (C ∨B) ∧ (C ∨ A ∨B)
NOR C = A+B (C ∨ A) ∧ (C ∨B) ∧ (C ∨ A ∨B)
XOR C = A⊕B (A ∨B ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨ C)
XNOR C = A⊕B (A ∨B ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨ C)
NOT C = A (A ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨ C)
Figure 2.20 is an example circuit, encoding the equation (AB+C) obfuscated with two












Figure 2.20: Example Circuit for Tseitin Transformation
Each gate output was given a label, G1-G5. These labels are then used to find the
Tseitin transformation of each gate, as shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Tseitin Example Transformations
Gate CNF Sub-Expression
G1 (A+B +G1)(A+G1)(B +G1)
G2 (C +G2)(C +G2)
G3 (G1 +K1 +G3)(G1 +K1 +G3)(G1 +K1 +G3)(G1 +K1 +G3)
G4 (G2 +K2 +G4)(G2 +K2 +G4)(G2 +K2 +G4)(G2 +K2 +G4)
G5 (G3 +G4 +G5)(G3 +G5)(G4 +G5)(G5)
Connecting each of the individual CNF formulas with AND operations yields a full
CNF equation for the circuit. As gate G5 represents the output of the circuit, an
additional lone (G5) clause was added to force the circuit output to be one and yield
the correct results from a SAT solver.
2.7.2 Bypass Attack
The bypass attack proposed in [30] is an attack that was designed to capitalize
on the vulnerabilities of various SAT attack-resistant locking mechanisms, such as
SARLock [25]. Based on a SAT attack, once the attacker has found all DIPs for an
incorrect key they would be able to use that key and reverse the outputs to become
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correct. A “bypass circuit” could be attached alongside the original locked netlist
to monitor the DIPs to change incorrect outputs to the correct outputs based on
SARLock’s flip bit.
2.7.3 Key Sensitization Attack
Proposed in [24], the key sensitization attack is performed by determining input
patterns that allow key bits to propagate to the outputs of the circuit. This is done
using Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) tools, which are ordinarily used
to generate input patterns for fault analysis of circuits [38]. They can, however, be
leveraged to determine input patterns that propagate key bits to the output.










Figure 2.21: Circuit Vulnerable to the Key Sensitization Attack
The input pattern shown in the figure would allow an attacker to sensitize the key bit
K1 to the output Y and observe its value.
The SLL method of obfuscation was developed as a means to prevent this type of
attack. By ensuring that the gates are connected in such a way that they cannot
expose key values, this attack could be rendered ineffective [3].
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2.7.4 Signal Probability Skew Attack
An attack was formulated in [39] known as the Signal Probability Skew (SPS) attack,
designed to specifically attack the Anti-SAT method of obfuscation. This attack is
used to analyze the SPS of gates g and g. These gates will very likely have the highest
skews of the circuit and can be easily singled out and guessed. These gates can also
be removed, and the value of their output can be determined by analyzing the skew
of the output of the block itself.
2.8 Physical Unclonable Functions
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are components that produce a unique value
per-chip. They utilize variations in the silicon and manufacturing process to ensure
that each will give a different response. This is called a Challenge/Response Pair
(CRP), and must be unique for each PUF [40].
The space of this CRP can vary based on the type of PUF, either weak or strong. A
strong PUF is defined as one with, “so many CRPs such that an attack (performed
during a limited amount of time) based on exhaustively measuring the CRPs has only
a negligible probability of success” [41]. A weak PUF is one with a restricted CRP
space, sometimes only a single CRP. These are often used for creation of a single value
per-chip.
PUFs are useful for designs that need a unique identifier or key that differs from
instance-to-instance such that no two devices will ever share a key. These values cannot
be detected during the manufacturing process/bitstream programming. LUT-Lock




A PUF must be provably unclonable, unique, and random in order to guarantee
security. Barbareschi offers a number of equations for determining if a design fits
these characteristics, as well as several definitions that help simplify the language
surrounding the components [40].
First, a PUF is formally defined by Equation 2.8.
θ ∈ Θ : C → R|θ(c) = r, c ∈ C, r ∈ R (2.8)
The function θ takes a challenge, c, as an input and returns a response r. C is the set
of all challenges, and R is the set of all responses that map to these challenges. The
CRP in this case would be defined as the pair (c, θ(c)) = (c, r), and a PUF is a device
which is able to provide a unique CRP for each device.
Unclonability is one of the main properties of PUFs, which means that they cannot be
mimicked on another device. This ensures that a design that is dependent on a specific
PUF output will only work for a certain challenge on a certain chip. Unclonability is
defined by the following series of functions [40]:
@f : θ(c) = f(c) = r,∀c ∈ C (2.9)
@θ′ : θ(c) = θ′(c) = r,∀c ∈ C (2.10)
Both equations state similar properties, but with slightly differing contexts. Equa-
tion 2.9 states that a mathematical function f cannot be found that would produce
the same set of CRPs as the initial PUF. Equation 2.10 similarly states that it would




Another major characteristic that all PUFs must adhere to is uniqueness, which is
similar to unclonability and can often be mistaken for such, but has a key difference.
This property is defined by Equation 2.11.
@θ̃ ∈ Θ : θ̃(c) = θ(c) = r,∀c ∈ Ĉ ⊆ C (2.11)
The key distinction of Equation 2.11 is that uniqueness requires that a θ̃ which belongs
to Θ and produces the same CRP cannot exist. It also must only hold valid for a
subset of C.
These properties of PUFs allow them to make ideal keys which cannot be discerned at
any stage of the manufacture process.
2.9 Substitution Boxes
Security in block ciphers relies on the incorporation of components that add to both
the confusion and diffusion of the data. Confusion is the process of making each bit of
ciphertext dependent on multiple key bits, thus obscuring the connection between the
key and the encrypted data. Diffusion spreads the information in the plaintext out
across a substantial amount of the ciphertext, such that if a single bit of plaintext is
changed half of the bits of ciphertext will change, on average [42]. A major component
in block ciphers that helps create these security measures, specifically confusion, is the
substitution box (S-box), which is the main component being obfuscated in this work.
An important quality of S-boxes is that they are nonlinear components, and are
typically the only nonlinear components in a block cipher [6]. These components





The S-box used in the MK-3 cipher uses 16-bit inputs and outputs which was, at
the time, believed to be the largest S-box used in a cryptographic algorithm [43]. As
with most other ciphers, this S-box is the main source of confusion and is the only
nonlinear element in the algorithm.
The algorithm for MK-3 is designed to be customizable, so that a number of different
S-boxes are available for different implementations. This results in the need for the
component to be protected, as it is important to guarantee the security of the cipher
for its users [44].
This S-box design from Wood’s Master’s thesis on the topic [6] was used because
it could be efficiently implemented in hardware. It functions very similarly to the
AES S-box, as it is also created by calculating a multiplicative inverse in a finite field
and then performing an affine transformation. This function can be represented as
S(α) = A · α−1 + b, where α denotes the 16-bit input to the function, which is treated
as a polynomial in GF (216). The affine transformation is handled by the matrix A and
the 16-bit vector b. The multiplicative inverse of α is calculated using an irreducible
polynomial f(x) = x16 + x5 + x3 + x+ 1.
As this S-box is customizable, the values for f(x), A, and b can be selected to create
a unique S-box without jeopardizing the security of the cipher [44].
2.9.2 AES S-Box
AES utilizes an 8-bit S-box component for its confusion. This S-box’s function is in
two steps: the multiplicative inverse of the input value is taken in the Galois Field of
GF (28) and then an affine transformation is performed over a binary Galois Field [45].
The design of this particular S-box was chosen based on both nonlinearity — leading
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to the lowest possible correlation between inputs and outputs and the lowest possible
difference propagation probability — and the algebraic complexity of determining the
values [46]. These criteria were chosen to make the confusion for the cipher as strong
as possible.
2.10 SIMON Block Cipher
In 2013 the National Security Agency (NSA) designed two families of lightweight
block ciphers for use in highly resource constrained devices, SIMON and SPECK [47].
The SIMON family was optimized to be implemented on hardware devices, while the
SPECK family of ciphers was optimized to be run in software. Each cipher could be
configured to use varying block and key sizes, ranging from 32/64 — denoting a 32-bit
block and 64-bit key — to 128/256.
This research will focus on making use of the SIMON family of ciphers as One-way
Random Functions (ORFs) for obfuscation.
The SIMON cipher is designed as a Feistel network, thus removing the need for
separate encryption and decryption logic. This network consists of a number of rounds
and a key scheduler, each of which is determined by the block and key size being
implemented.
The round consists of multiple rotation, logical AND, and logical XOR operations,
and is shown visually in Figure 2.22.
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Figure 2.22: One Round of SIMON [47]
In the figure, n is the number of bits being used for the operations, which is half of the
configured block size; xi and xi+1 are the upper and lower halves of the block being
used in round i; and Sn represents a left circular shift by n bits.
The key scheduler, which produces an n-bit ki for each round i, is what gives the SIMON
cipher the majority of its confusion. It defines five round sequences, z0 . . . z4, which
are used as round constants to remove slide properties and circular shift symmetries.
Each of these sequences is used for different block/key size combinations to provide
additional separation between similar configurations. The scheduler also uses a round
constant c that is defined as c = 2n − 4 =0xff· · · fc.
The equation for each round key is defined by the piecewise function in Equation 2.12.
ki+m =

c⊕ (zj)i ⊕ ki ⊕ (I ⊕ S
−1)S−3ki+1, m = 2,
c⊕ (zj)i ⊕ ki ⊕ (I ⊕ S
−1)S−3ki+2, m = 3,
c⊕ (zj)i ⊕ ki ⊕ (I ⊕ S




In this equation, m is defined as the number of key words being used, which varies
based on the configuration; and (zj)i represents the i
th bit of the sequence zj that is
used for that configuration. These configuration-specific values are defined in Table 2.4.













32 64 16 4 z0 32
48 72 24 3 z0 36
96 24 4 z1 36
64 96 32 3 z2 42
128 32 4 z3 44
96 96 48 2 z2 52
144 48 3 z3 54
128 128 64 2 z2 68
192 64 3 z3 69
256 64 4 z4 72
Using the information from the table and the function in Equation 2.12, a round key
can be made for each round of operation and the block cipher is complete.
The intention is to use SIMON as an ORF, similar to the use of AES from [29].
2.10.1 Round-Reduced SIMON
A round-reduced version of SIMON could possibly be used as an ORF as long as it
still provides strong confusion and diffusion properties.
Several works have been published that look at the cryptanalysis of round-reduced
SIMON and determine the minimum number of rounds that cannot be broken by
several common attacks. In [48] the results were summarized in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5: Summary of results on SIMON. CP = chosen plaintexts, CC = chosen ciphertexts,
Att. = attacked, Succ. = success, Ref. = reference. [48]
Cipher Rounds Time Data Memory Succ.
Full Att. Bytes Rate
Differential
SIMON32/64 32 18 246.0 231.2CP 215.0 0.632
SIMON48/72 36 19 252.0 246.0CC 220.0 0.981
SIMON48/96 36 19 276.0 246.0CC 220.0 0.981
SIMON64/96 42 26 263.9 263.0CP 231.0 0.863
SIMON64/128 44 26 294.0 263.0CP 231.0 0.863
SIMON96/96 52 35 293.3 293.2CP 237.8 0.632
SIMON96/144 54 35 2101.0 293.2CP 237.8 0.632
SIMON128/128 68 46 2125.7 2125.6CP 240.6 0.632
SIMON128/192 69 46 2142.0 2125.6CP 240.6 0.632
SIMON128/256 72 46 2206.0 2125.6CP 240.6 0.632
Related-Key Rectangle
SIMON32/64 32 18 254.55 230.86CP 232.86 0.632
Impossible Differential
SIMON32/64 32 13 250.1 230.0CP 220.0 ≈ 1
SIMON48/96 36 15 253.0 238.0CP 220.6 ≈ 1
SIMON64/128 44 17 271.0 252.0CP 221.0 ≈ 1
SIMON96/144 54 20 2111.0 284.0CP 219.6 ≈ 1
SIMON128/256 72 25 2195.0 2119.0CP 223.0 ≈ 1
The results in Table 2.5 suggest that, depending on the attack used and the size of
the cipher, as few as 13 rounds can be an effective cipher. Given this, a severely
round-reduced implementation could be effective as an ORF.
One reason a round-reduced implementation may be wanted is to account for overhead.
Though SIMON is a much smaller block cipher than AES, it can still add substantial
overhead to the circuit even with fewer rounds. As this research is being conducted,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is running a competition to
find a new lightweight cipher for use in resource-constrained applications [49]. Though
the finalists and winner have not been announced at this time, this could lead to other




Much work has been done in the last several years on improving the security of logic
locking algorithms for hardware obfuscation; however, little research has been done
that analyzes the effects of these obfuscation methods on cryptographic components.
This research seeks to analyze the effectiveness of several methods of obfuscation
on non-linear cryptographic components, specifically S-boxes, against SAT attacks.
Obfuscating these components would be particularly valuable for any proprietary
or customizable cryptographic operations implemented in hardware. Similar work
in analyzing different obfuscation methods has been done previously, however this
research only tests against a series of relatively basic components from the ISCAS ‘85
benchmark set [50].
3.1 Circuit Obfuscation Program
A Python program was written which can obfuscate a Verilog gate-level netlist using
several logic locking methods. This software was able to parse these netlists into
lists of gates and wires and then modify those to implement an obfuscation method
determined by the user.
To prepare the circuits for testing, if they were not already in the form of a gate-level
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netlist, the circuits were synthesized using Leodardo Spectrum. For this synthesis
a generic ASIC standard gate library was used, and a helper script was written in
Python which converted the gate definitions from that library into standard Verilog































Figure 3.1: Process Workflow
The locking methods implemented were the random locking method proposed in [22],
as well as two which place the locking gates at either the highest or the lowest stages
of the circuit, and LUT-Lock — a more recently proposed locking method made to
specifically defend against SAT attacks [28], and a small modification of LUT-Lock.
The two methods which utilize gate stage as metrics for locking are based on the fully
random locking methods, but place all locking gates in either the highest or lowest
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stages possible. The stage of a gate is determined by the largest number of gates from
primary inputs; so a gate with two primary inputs has a stage of 0, a gate with one
primary input and one input which passes through two levels of gates has a stage of 2,










Figure 3.2: Circuit Stages
Each gate is labeled with its stage in the design, which starts from 0 — with primary
inputs — and increments with each gate that must be passed through from those
inputs.
These obfuscation methods were used to protect both the 8-bit AES S-box as well as the
16-bit MK-3 S-box [43] with key sizes ranging from 16-bits to 128 bits. These methods
were also used to obfuscate a subset of the ISCAS ‘85 combinational benchmarks to
attempt to replicate some of the work done in [50].
The obfuscated circuits then had a SAT attack run against them using the attack tool
from [26]. To use this tool, the netlists had to be converted into bench format, which
was accomplished with another Python script.
For each circuit, each obfuscation method was run and then attacked ten times, and
the amount of time the attack took to complete was recorded. A timeout was set so
that if the attack ran for more than five days it was stopped. This was a requirement
set by the server cluster being utilized for testing.
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The results for a SAT attack run on the ISCAS benchmarks with random locking
gates inserted closely mimicked the results from [50], though that work tested fewer
key sizes so a full comparison could not be made.
3.1.1 Modified Random Locking Implementation
The random locking method of encryption is theoretically vulnerable to physical
reverse engineering attacks where the attacker could X-ray or otherwise analyze the
traces in a chip to find and remove the locking gates. This is possible because the
locking gates in this method would only be added into wires, so replacing them with
buffers could invalidate the security.
As a countermeasure to this, a method was developed which would randomly either
insert locking gates into the internal signals — as was done in the original method —
or replace inverters with locking gates. For any inverters being replaced, the locking
gate would correspond to the opposite gate — either XOR or XNOR — as was used
to obfuscate the internal wires. This should ultimately have no impact on the SAT
attack as the effect of each key bit remains the same, it should only increase the
difficulty of physical analysis attacks.
3.1.2 LUT-Lock Implementation
The final algorithm proposed in LUT-Lock [28] was referred to as NB2-MO-HSC,
which was a combination of several heuristics used to determine which gates should
be obfuscated to increase security against SAT attacks. The algorithm which was put
forward in the research relied on narrowing down which outputs could be obfuscated
based on their timing requirements before locking specific gates. When implementing
this algorithm for testing, the timing aspect was ignored, as the designs were eventually
intended for use on FPGAs which will adjust routing to ensure timing constraints are
met if possible. Should it become clear that these considerations are important for
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the security of the design, they could be re-added.
3.1.2.1 Key Programmable Gate Insertion
To test the functionality of a LUT-based obfuscation method, Key Programmable
Gates (KPGs) needed to be added. These are gates which, when given the correct key
act in the way that they are intended, otherwise they behave differently [51]. As with
previous methods, this was most easily accomplished using XOR and XNOR gates,
but it can be done with multiplexers or LUTs. XORs and XNORs were ultimately
used for this purpose again, as the attack tool would not be able to parse anything
other than primitive gates; however, should this algorithm be used on actual devices,
the gates would ideally be rolled into LUTs.
Gates of this nature are only required for testing when dealing with FPGAs, since an
implementation on an actual device would use PUFs or NLFSRs for key inputs rather
than primary inputs.
3.1.2.2 LUT-Lock Modification
A further modification done to the LUT-Lock method was based on how the candidate
list of gates was initially formed. In the originally proposed algorithm, a single output
would be chosen to be obfuscated first based on the timing requirements. This port’s
fan-in cone would be obfuscated through until no candidates in that cone could
remain, and once that occurred the next output would be obfuscated. This creates
a potential issue of incomplete obfuscation in the circuit with keys below a certain
size — determined by the size of the circuit itself. If smaller keys were used with this
algorithm as it was presented, not all outputs would necessarily be obfuscated before
the number of key bits was exceeded. To fix this, rather than fully iterating through
the fan-in cone of each output and obfuscating based on the metrics, all outputs were
added as candidates at the beginning. This ensured that each output received some
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level of obfuscation, as long as the size of the key was greater than the number of
output bits.
The algorithm followed the original from this point: finding the child gates from the
fan-in cone with the lowest effect on primary outputs and highest SPS, obfuscating that
gate, forbidding its children from being obfuscated, and adding the obfuscated gate’s
children’s children to the candidate list. Both this modified form of the LUT-Lock
algorithm and the original NB2-MO-HSC method were used for obfuscation testing.
3.2 SIMON as an ORF Experiments
Variations of the SIMON block cipher [47] were used as One-way Random Functions
(ORFs) for obfuscating circuits in the manner presented in [29]. The configuration
used, prior to any modifications, was the 32/64 implementation of the cipher with a
32-bit block size and a 64-bit key. These netlists were derived from a Very High Speed
Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) HDL (VHDL) implementation of the 64/128 SIMON
block cipher [52]. The key scheduler from that project was modified to accommodate
the 32/64 size cipher and the rounds were resized appropriately.
To attempt to establish a trend that relates the number of rounds of SIMON to its
strength as an ORF for this application, several round-reduced implementations of
the cipher were created and tested.
Another experiment involved fixing both the plaintext and the key inputs to the cipher,
respectively. The purpose of fixing these values for certain tests was to protect against
the possibility of removal attacks. As noted in the original paper [29], in reference to
the AES, a cipher of this nature could have a known synthesis profile and an adversary
could simply remove the relevant gates if it were discovered. By fixing these values
prior to synthesis, the post-synthesis model would be effectively unrecognizable.
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Before using a possibly round-reduced SIMON for this purpose, the SAT attack’s
effectiveness against it must be analyzed. To do this, the SAT attack tool from [26]
was used. The “unlocked” netlist given was a netlist with a fixed key, as that key was
the value being searched for, and the locked netlist was the standard SIMON block.
This test was done using round-reduced implementations ranging from 1–8, 16, 24,
and 32 rounds.
Following these experiments, the three variations of SIMON were used as ORFs for
the MK-3 S-box. The actual number of locking gates used for the obfuscation itself
was fixed at 32 to match the size of the SIMON block. For each input variation of
SIMON; 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 24, and 32 round instances were tested, each 10
times.
3.3 Obfuscated Models
Several models were used in the obfuscation experiments, covering a range of sizes
and structures.
The first six models come from a set of benchmarks referred to as the ISCAS ’85
benchmarks [53]. These benchmarks are a series of standard combinational circuits
used for gate-level ATPG testing and fault simulation. The original work did not,
however, disclose the functionality of the designs, merely their netlists, so further
work [54] has gone into discerning their operations as described in the “Description”
column of Table 3.1. This subset of circuits from the full ISCAS ’85 set were chosen
so that comparisons could be made with the results of the work which created specific
obfuscation benchmarks of these particular designs [50]. The netlists used as the base
for obfuscation were from [55].
The final two models are instances of S-boxes from both the AES and MK-3 block
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ciphers [43,45]. Both were created using composite field techniques to make the results
comparable between them. Both of these S-boxes were originally implemented in
VHDL; however, as the obfuscation tool only works with files based off of Verilog
netlists, the designs needed to be converted to Verilog. This conversion was done using
Leodardo Spectrum, which converted the design fully into two-input standard cell
gates, plus inverters, based on a standard ASIC library. This differs from the ISCAS
‘85 circuits used, as they use n-input standard cell gates, as well as including buffers
in several designs. This can lead to a misleading understanding of the comparison of
number of gates in the circuits, so it must be accounted for in analysis.
These models are described in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Obfuscated Models
Model Name # Inputs # Outputs # of Gates # of Stages Description
c432 36 7 160 16 27-channel inter-
rupt controller
c880 60 26 383 23 8-bit ALU
c1908 33 25 880 39 16-bit error de-
tector/corrector





c5315 178 123 2406 48 9-bit ALU
ISCAS ’85





AES S-Box 8 8 182 29 Composite field
S-Box for AES







To test the effectiveness of several obfuscation methods on protecting against SAT
attacks, the attack tool from [26] was used. Each base circuit being tested was
obfuscated with each tested key size and then attacked 10 times so averages could be
taken. Initially five different key lengths were used: 16-, 32-, 64-, 96-, and 128-bits.
These tests were conducted on a server with Intel Xeon Gold 6150 CPUs running at
2.70GHz. Each instance of a test was run on a single thread and given access to 24GB
of RAM with a timeout of five days.
Tests were generated using the Python programs described in Chapter 3 to obfuscate
the given netlists and convert them to the appropriate bench format for the attack
tool.
4.2 Basic Logic Locking
The first series of tests conducted were basic applications of different locking methods
on Verliog netlists using a custom program written in Python. These methods all
followed the initial direction of the papers from which they were derived: “EPIC” [22],
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in the case of random-based methods, and “LUT-Lock” [28].
“Random” refers to the original obfuscation described in “EPIC”. “High Stage” and
“Low Stage” refer to the modifications made to the random locking scheme in which
the locking gates are places at the highest and lowest stages respectively. “LUT-Lock”
is the original NB2-MO-HSC method from the “LUT-Lock” paper, with the only
modification being removal of the timing requirements. “Mod. LUT-Lock” describes
the modified instance of the NB2-MO-HSC locking scheme where all outputs are
added as candidates in the initial formation of the candidate gate list.
4.2.1 ISCAS ’85 Benchmarks
These netlist locking methods were first tested on six benchmark circuits from the
ISCAS ’85 set of benchmarks. This subset of benchmarks was used to serve as a
point of comparison against results collected when developing a series of hardware
obfuscation benchmarks [50].
Table 4.1 shows the results of the SAT attack breaking various obfuscation methods
applied to these circuits.
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Random High Stage Low Stage LUT-Lock Mod. LUT-Lock
0.026 0.025 0.021 0.032 0.023
0.041 0.035 0.095 0.081 0.054
0.162 0.164 0.208 0.281 0.269
0.480 0.285 0.585 0.304 0.471
0.509 0.563 0.603 0.159 1.101
0.048 0.025 0.055 0.035 0.020
0.062 0.074 0.074 0.131 0.021
0.116 0.197 0.143 0.108 0.047
0.306 0.347 0.333 0.198 0.103
0.386 0.616 0.695 0.221 0.347
0.077 0.049 0.067 0.095 0.034
0.103 0.076 0.285 0.237 0.046
0.336 0.172 1.518 0.990 0.367
0.748 0.162 4.904 2.325 0.514
1.677 0.303 7.172 3.352 1.193
0.210 0.102 0.558 0.133 0.077
0.312 0.192 1.084 0.265 0.109
0.982 1.498 1.581 0.666 0.260
1.142 5.069 1.788 0.873 0.559
1.484 6.939 2.498 1.924 0.752
0.219 0.150 0.244 0.189 0.113
0.365 0.213 0.353 0.358 0.113
0.541 0.506 0.545 0.647 0.114
0.824 0.962 0.822 0.665 0.115
0.924 2.294 1.089 1.006 0.135
0.265 0.241 0.304 0.282 0.169
0.488 0.346 0.455 0.401 0.170
0.709 0.640 0.746 3.599 0.168
1.149 1.101 1.345 0.970 0.168
1.486 1.826 1.750 26.661 0.338
59
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
The results of random locking on the benchmarks closely mimic the results of similar
tests from [50]; however not all key sizes tested in Table 4.1 are represented in that
work. For five of the six tested ISCAS benchmarks, only 32-bit keys were tested, with
c7552 having testing results for 32-, 64-, and 128-bit keys.
Results of the tests on these benchmarks show that as the number of gates in the
circuits increased, as did the general resilience to the SAT attack. However, all circuits
were broken exceedingly quickly, regardless of obfuscation method, with only some
outliers taking more than 1 second.
4.2.2 Substitution Boxes
The same tests which were performed on the ISCAS benchmarks were then performed
on the S-boxes from both the AES and MK-3. The results of these tests are shown in
Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Average SAT Attack Break Time (seconds) on S-boxes. “Timeout” indicates














Random High Stage Low Stage LUT-Lock Mod. LUT-Lock
0.194 0.084 0.118 0.121 0.552
3.098 3.582 0.408 0.561 5.788
86.166 157.058 1.613 15.021 25.137
401.362 215.286 102.879 158.688 307.201
1,114.959 220.349 2,689.538 219.187 1,048.692
582.454 281.531 165.035 490.311 946.375
692.276 253.747 81.716 24,973.522 2,676.279
270,519.970 32,865.659 482.897 281,140.660 59,992.760
Timeout 298,616.340 43,736.577 414,580.100 333,862.340
Timeout Timeout Timeout Timeout Timeout
As these show the averages over 10 tests, any tests which timed out show that all tests
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with a certain key size and locking method timed out, while tests with values nearly
at the timeout (such as LUT-Lock with a 96-bit key on the MK-3 S-box) indicate that
some tests timed out and some did not.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the results from Table 4.2 as bar charts. The y-axis uses a
logarithmic scale, as the amount of time required to break the obfuscation increased
drastically in most cases as the keys increased in size.






















Average SAT Break Times on Obfuscated AES S-Box
Random High Stage Low Stage
LUT-Lock Mod. LUT-Lock
Figure 4.1: SAT Attack on AES S-Box obfuscated with different methods
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Average SAT Break Times on Obfuscated MK-3 S-Box
Random High Stage Low Stage
LUT-Lock Mod. LUT-Lock
Timeout
Figure 4.2: SAT Attack on MK-3 S-Box obfuscated with different methods. “Timeout”
indicates an unsuccessful attack after 5 days (432,000 seconds).
As the results show, random locking is generally the most effective defense against
SAT attacks on S-boxes such as these, despite LUT-Lock being an algorithm designed
specifically to combat this attack. LUT-Lock and its modified version both performed
rather well, though, depending on the test. The modifications made to the algorithm
appear to have improved its performance with the smaller AES S-box, while the
MK-3 S-box benefited notably more from the LUT-Lock algorithm as it was initially
proposed.
There were some anomalies in the results which currently do not have explanations —
specifically the low stage tests on the AES S-box with a 128-bit key. This obfuscation
method, though generally performing much worse than all other methods tested, took
significantly longer to break than the other methods in that test instance.
To further analyze the effect of key size on obfuscation effectiveness and possibly help
determine a suitable minimum key size for some of the tested obfuscation methods,
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a series of tests were run with finer granularity of key sizes — shown in Figures 4.3
and 4.4. Between the 32-bit and 64-bit keys, additional keys spaced out by 8-bits were
tested, but from 64 to 128-bits additional keys were only separated by 4-bits.
Figure 4.3 shows the finer grain keys from 32 to 96-bits, and Figure 4.4 shows the
finer grain keys from 96 to 128-bits.


















Average SAT Break Times on MK-3 S-Box
Random High Stage Low Stage
LUT-Lock Mod. LUT-Lock
Timeout
Figure 4.3: SAT Attack on MK-3 S-Box obfuscated with different methods. Finer grain






























Average SAT Break Times on MK-3 S-Box
Random High Stage Low Stage
LUT-Lock Mod. LUT-Lock
Timeout
Figure 4.4: SAT Attack on MK-3 S-Box obfuscated with different methods. Finer grain
keys between 96 and 128-bits “Timeout” indicates an unsuccessful attack after 5 days (432,000
seconds).
As shown in the figures: past 84-bits, random locking was consistently reaching the
five day timeout on all tests, and all other methods showed a general positive trend
as the number of key bits increased. They did not all consistently reach the timeout
until a 128-bit key was used. The modified implementation of LUT-Lock, though
generally performing worse than the unmodified implementation, did reach a point of
consistently timing out across all tests with only a 104-bit key while the unmodified
version was still being broken for some tests. A similar phenomenon was seen with
the low-stage random locking: though performing substantially worse than all other
methods for almost all key sizes tested, it began consistently reaching the timeout of
the tests with a 116-bit key, where both high-stage and normal LUT-Lock were still
being broken.
These results generally aligned with what was expected based on previous tests, and
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confirmed that for random locking of the MK-3 S-box an 84-bit key may be considered
suitably large, where other methods may require up to a 128-bit key. Further analysis
may be necessary given additional testing, though, especially given the number of
tests which were being broken close to the timeout value. If a longer timeout could be
set, then the additional information gained could further point to what would be a
suitably large key size for all tested methods.
4.2.2.1 Comparing ISCAS and Substitution Box Results
These results, when compared to those of the ISCAS benchmarks, indicate that there
is an element of the design of these S-boxes which makes them naturally more resistant
to SAT attacks. The two ISCAS benchmarks which are closest in size to the S-boxes
are c432 and c1908, which correspond to the AES and MK-3 S-boxes respectively.
When comparing the amount of time these circuits were able to withstand the SAT
attack, it is clear that there is a difference of orders of magnitude.
This large difference for similarly sized designs may indicate that the inherent non-
linearity of the S-boxes may increase the complexity of the Boolean SAT problem.
Further analysis of these circuit structures would be required, but may be able to
indicate types of modifications which could be made which will naturally increase a
design’s resiliency against the SAT attack.
4.2.3 Modifications to Locking Methods
Three modifications to previously published locking methods were tested with both
the ISCAS benchmarks and the S-boxes: high stage random locking, low stage random
locking, and a modified NB2-MO-HSC algorithm from “LUT-Lock”. These each
performed generally distinctly from the locking methods that they are derived from,




The high and low stage random locking methods both performed generally much worse
than the original purely random locking method; however, placing the obfuscating
gates in higher circuit stages almost always performed substantially better than placing
them in lower stages. This is supported by several of the preliminary algorithms from
“LUT-Lock” [28]. Being closer to the outputs generally results in much lower output
corruption and higher SPS, which has been shown to increase the difficulty of the
SAT attack. The opposite should then be true of placing gates at lower stages, where
output corruption would be maximized and the locking gates would be much more
easily controlled by changes in the input patterns.
An interesting phenomenon occurred when using the high stage locking on the MK-3
S-box: each successful SAT attack only took a single iteration, and each unsuccessful
one was stuck on processing that first iteration. This behavior was not seen with any
other circuit being tested. This would seem to indicate that an aspect of the design of
this S-box combined with the locking gates being placed as close to the outputs as
possible creates a situation where finding a DIP might be difficult, but once a single
DIP is found it will always lead to the correct key.
4.2.3.2 Modified LUT-Lock
The modification to LUT-Lock which included all output gates in the initial obfuscation
candidate list seemed to behave inconsistently in relation to the original implementation.
The purpose of this modification was to ensure that all outputs would have at least
one gate of obfuscation if the number of key bits allowed for it; however this generally
seemed to decrease the effectiveness of the algorithm. This dynamic is reversed when
obfuscating the AES S-box, though it is unclear why that would be the case.
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4.3 ORF Added Logic Locking
Following the tests of basic logic locking on the ISCAS benchmarks and S-boxes, tests
following the ORF insertion scheme from [29] were performed. The ORF suggested in
that research was an implementation of AES with a fixed key; however, AES is a large
block cipher and could incur too much overhead to be feasible. It is for this reason
that SIMON, a small hardware-optimized block cipher, was used as an ORF for these
tests [56].
To attempt to find a trend between number of rounds and effectiveness as an ORF,
several round-reduced implementations on SIMON were tested. The first tests run
were attacks on round-reduced implementations of the SIMON cipher itself. 1–8, 16,
24, and 32 round implementations of the SIMON 32/64 block cipher were tested using
the SAT attack. For this attack, the “unlocked” netlist was a netlist with a fixed
key synthesized in, and the “obfuscated” netlists were the various implementations
of SIMON with the SAT attack searching for the key. The tool requires two netlists
since an important step in the SAT attack algorithm is a comparison of the output of
locked netlists against the correct output of the circuit. These netlists are depicted as









Figure 4.5: SAT Attack on SIMON Netlists
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The top block shows the SIMON netlist with no fixed inputs — this is treated by the
tool as the “obfuscated” or “locked” circuit. The bottom block is an implementation of
SIMON with a fixed key; this key value is what the attack is trying to determine for
the “locked” implementation.
The results of running these tests are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: SAT Attack Break Time (seconds) on SIMON. “Timeout” indicates an unsuc-
cessful attack after 5 days (432,000 seconds).












The implementations with 1–6 rounds were broken rather quickly, but 7 rounds or
more were not broken in the given timeout range with this attack. Given that,
implementations used as ORFs for obfuscation should not be broken if 7 or more
rounds are implemented.
Tests similar to those done with basic logic locking were conducted using SIMON
as an ORF between the primary key inputs of the circuit and the keys to the gates.
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Three base configurations of SIMON were used for this test: no fixed inputs, fixed key,
and fixed plaintext. The fixed input implementations were tested as ways to possibly
combat removal attacks as well as provide additional security against SAT attacks.
As the base configuration of this cipher is published, it is possible that an adversary
could identify the structure in a netlist and remove it, thus invalidating the protection.
By fixing an input before synthesis it should create an unrecognizable structure and
possibly prevent the removal. The standard implementation was then also examined
to determine if having the full cipher gave additional security against SAT attacks,
despite being more susceptible to removal attacks.
Rather than modulate key size in the tests, the number of rounds of SIMON was
changed. This is done to analyze the trends in the amount of security each imple-
mentation offers and to determine if the full cipher is required or if a round-reduced
implementation could be used and still provide substantial additional security.
The locking method used for these tests was the random locking scheme with a 32-bit
key. The random method was chosen as it generally offered the highest security for
most circuits tested, and a 32-bit key was used to correspond to the 32-bit output of
the SIMON block.





























































































(c) No fixed input SIMON used as an ORF
Figure 4.6: SIMON ORF MK-3 S-box Test Setups
Table 4.4 shows the results of these tests on the MK-3 S-box.
Table 4.4: Average SAT Attack Break Time (seconds) on MK-3 S-box with SIMON as an

























Table 4.5 shows the results of these tests on the AES S-box.
Table 4.5: Average SAT Attack Break Time (seconds) on AES S-box with SIMON as an























Table 4.6 shows the results of these tests on the ISCAS ’85 c432 benchmark.
Table 4.6: Average SAT Attack Break Time (seconds) on ISCAS c432 with SIMON as an

























Table 4.7 shows the results of these tests on the ISCAS ’85 c1908 benchmark.
Table 4.7: Average SAT Attack Break Time (seconds) on ISCAS c1908 with SIMON as an























Figure 4.7 gives these data in bar charts.
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Average SAT Break Times on MK-3 S-Box
with Random Obfuscation and SIMON ORF


























Average SAT Break Times on AES S-Box
with Random Obfuscation and SIMON ORF



























Average SAT Break Times on ISCAS c432
with Random Obfuscation and SIMON ORF




(c) ISCAS ’85 c432






















Average SAT Break Times on ISCAS c1908
with Random Obfuscation and SIMON ORF




(d) ISCAS ’85 c1908
Figure 4.7: SAT Attack Results on Locked Circuits with SIMON Configurations as ORFs
Most implementations with as few as two rounds showed a greater resistance to the
attack than the average amount of time the SAT attack took to be successful with only
basic logic locking, but continuing to increase the number of rounds showed substantial
differences between each configuration. Across all circuits and implementations the
tests which used a fixed key performed worse than the other two methods, though
still offered notable added security over the basic implementations without an ORF.
The tests which did not fix any input value, timed out above 14 rounds and offered
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drastic security improvements for all implementations above 10 rounds. This may
not have performed perfectly at 8 rounds, despite the cipher itself not being broken
with that many rounds, because there are a greater number of possible keys which
could lead to the correct output. As the outputs of the cipher are connected to the
obfuscation key gates, any input combinations which give the cipher that output
would be valid. This should lead to multiple possible input vectors, at least 232 as
that is the maximum possible plaintext values, that could give the correct output.
This should remain a rather small subset of all 296 possible input vectors (both key
and plaintext), but could weaken the cipher enough to make implementations with
fewer rounds more vulnerable than they would otherwise be.
The test which showed the most rapid improvement in SAT attack resistance with
increasing rounds was the implementation of SIMON synthesized with a fixed plaintext
input. Almost all tests conducted with an implementation of SIMON using 8 or more
rounds and a fixed plaintext timed out at the maximum 5 days. This method is also
susceptible to the issue of multiple valid keys, however with a fixed plaintext there
will be fewer such keys, which may indicate the increased security.
Fixing the plaintext seems to retain the most cryptographic strength as well as
possibly providing some protection against a removal attack, though more testing with
additional plaintext values must be conducted. The removal protection may also be
extremely minimal, as fixing the plaintext values should only affect the first 2 rounds
and would then have a very small impact on the synthesized design of the circuit.
Ultimately, adding SIMON as an ORF seems to vastly increase security in both the
cases of fixed plaintext and no fixed inputs regardless of the circuit it was applied
to. All ISCAS benchmarks tested with only logic locking were broken on the order of
seconds, but by adding this additional circuit the two tested benchmarks were able to




Including SIMON does incur some overhead which must be accounted for when
designing a circuit. Table 4.8 gives data on the gate overhead for each configuration
of SIMON that was tested.
Table 4.8: SIMON 32/64 Overheads (# of 2-Input Gates)
Rounds: 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 24 32
Fixed Key 107 211 320 433 551 659 770 870 1338 1765
Fixed Plaintext 67 200 435 675 919 1155 1391 1628 2583 3540
No Fixed Inputs 128 256 495 717 955 1194 1432 1672 2634 3586
Each implementation and number of rounds adds a different amount of overhead to
go with the different amount of security offered. The configuration which uses a fixed
key is the smallest for more than 8 rounds, but also offers the least security. Fixed
plaintext, while substantially stronger than fixed key, greatly increases the number of
gates necessary to implement the function as the number of rounds increases. The
implementation with no fixed inputs, which had similar results to that of the fixed
plaintext, has the largest implementations for all numbers of rounds, but is only
slightly more than the fixed plaintext configuration.
When using an ORF, the overhead of the obfuscation method itself must also be
accounted for. For all of the discussed netlist logic locking methods, the overhead is
one gate per key bit.
Other lightweight ciphers could also be considered for use as ORFs moving forward.
The NIST competition for lightweight ciphers [49] is ongoing at the time of this




Ultimately, the utility of each of these implementations and ciphers must be determined
on a case-by-case basis, based on the size of the design being obfuscated, the security




The inclusion of different hardware obfuscation techniques has been shown to be an
effective method of preventing SAT attacks. The methods explored in this work offered
varying levels of success, with random gate placement and ORF insertion ultimately
offering the most security for the tested components, in some cases increasing the
attack time from fractions of a second to several days. Additionally, substitution
boxes showed a much higher resistance to SAT attacks than the standard ISCAS ’85
benchmarks, which could indicate that non-linear components are, by design, harder
to break in this way. Further work needs to be done to analyze what specific aspect
of the S-boxes increased the complexity of the SAT attack and what other types of
components could offer this same strength.
Other future work might include examining other lightweight ciphers for use as ORFs
for obfuscation, analyzing the effectiveness of other attacks on these cryptographic
components, or better determining the effectiveness of different configurations of
SIMON as an ORF.
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